தோற்றும் – புத்தி வரவில்லை.
வயதுக்கேற்ற பெருந்தன்மை வரவில்லை.
நாங்கள் தோற்கவே இல்லை என்று
புள்ளி விவரங்களை திரித்துக் காட்டுகிறார்…..
தமிழக மக்கள் இனி என்றுமே இவரை அதிகாரத்தில் அமர்த்தக்கூடாது
என்பதற்கான இன்னொரு ஆதாரம் கீழே –
பழம்பெரும் எழுத்தாளர் புலமைப்பித்தன் தன் மனம் திறந்து பேசுகிறார்
ஆதாரம் இல்லாத குற்றச்சாட்டுக்கள் அல்ல.
ஆதாரம் பேட்டியின் கீழேயே,
NDTV தொலைக்காட்சி ஆசிரியர் கோகலே அவர்களின்
புத்தகச் சுருக்கத்திலேயே இருப்பதைக் காணலாம்.
about the book -” Sri Lanka from War to Peace ”
Defence and Strategic Affairs Editor with NDTV,
Gokhale covered the 33-month Eelam War in SriLanka.
The Mi-17s that India ‘quietly gifted’ to Lanka
were in addition to a Sukanya class offshore
patrol vessel also gifted by the Indian Coast Guard
to the Sri Lankan Navy in 2002.
The choppers played a major role in several
daring missions launched by the Sri Lankan Air Force
to rescue the army’s deep penetration units and
injured soldiers from deep inside LTTE-held
territory, the book says.
“Hampered by domestic compulsion, New Delhi
could not go beyond such meagre and clandestine
transfer of military hardware. Publicly all India
was willing to acknowledge was the supply of
low-flying detection “Indra” radars to the
Sri Lankan Air Force since this equipment was
considered a defensive apparatus,” the author says.
Gokhale quotes senior Sri Lankan army officers
saying that thanks to the Mi-17s, the soldiers
operating behind enemy lines functioned with
a greater degree of confidence since they knew
these choppers were always at hand to come to
their rescue whenever necessary. This surely was
the key factor in our Special Forces delivering s
Not wanting to annoy its Tamil Nadu allies like
the DMK unnecessarily, New Delhi had a
‘politically most important message’ conveyed to
Colombo to try and conclude the war against the
LTTE (called Eelam War IV) before the summer
of 2009 when India was expected to hold the
general elections, Gokhale says.
“The Rajapakse regime was nothing if not shrewd”.
Aware of dynamics that determined India’s
Lankan policies, it was also conscious of India’s
anxiety in losing strategic space in Sri Lanka.
The Rajapakse brothers were pragmatic enough to
realize that Lanka needed India’s support in war
against the LTTE, total support from China and
Colombo could ignore India but only upto a point,
the author says.
So Mahinda Rajapakse hit upon an idea of an
informal exchange mechanism between New Delhi
and Colombo. He nominated both his brothers –
Basil (MP and Presidential advisor) and Gotabaya,
the Defence Secretary along with his own secretary
India too reciprocated immediately. The Indian team
comprised National Security Advisor M K Narayanan,
Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and Defence
Secretary Vijay Singh.
Colombo may have been ambivalent about meeting
Indian requests to end the operations before
the general elections but the Sri Lankan leadership
once again gratefully acknowledged the Indian Navy’s
contribution in locating and destroying at least
10 ‘floating warehouses’ owned by the LTTE that
were used by the Tigers to store arms, ammunition
and even armoured personnel carriers.
Well-coordinated operations by the two navies
between 2006 and 2009 actually broke the backbone
of the Sea Tigers, Gokhale says.
Also, under an agreement between the two countries,
the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard frequently
sent out ships to patrol the Palk Strait and
the Gulf of Mannar. Presence of warships and
Indian patrol vessels acted as firm deterrence
against the Sea Tigers, the book says.